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Abstract. The paper addresses the question whether the now-
infamous piece of econometric research conducted by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) that set the threshold hypothesis in the relation 
between public debt and economic growth was conducted in 
accordance with the neopositivist doctrine. The article consists of 
two parts. First, the epistemic advice given by logical positivism is 
reconstructed and operationalized. Second, the cliometric method 
employed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is analyzed. The answer 
to the research question is affirmative. ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ 
is a piece of logical-positivist science because (1) the research is 
data-based and aimed at confirming the results, (2) its authors are 
committed to the neopositivist theory-observation distinction, (3) 
its goal is describing an empirical generalization and the result’s 
interpretations suggest that (4) Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
understand causality in a reductionist way, as a constant 
conjunction. 
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Introduction 
 
The question whether or not economics is a neopositivist science recurs 
throughout the philosophy-of-economics literature. On the one hand, some 
methodologists criticize economics for being a discipline too dependent on 
logical-positivist doctrine, which is currently out of fashion among philosophers 
of science (Scheuer 2015; 2013; Boland 1991; McCloskey 1989). On the other 
hand, Hutchison (2000) and Schinckus (2010) accuse economists of not paying 
enough attention to empirical data and, instead, relying too much on formalized, 
theoretical models. These critics point out the disadvantages of research practice 
from the perspective of logical positivism. And McCloskey (1998, p. 228) seems to 
join both groups of critics. Her book claims that economics is ‘too neopositivistic 
a discipline’ and accuses economists of being ‘too bound to empiricism and 
constant (big-M) methodology’ – to use her own terminology – but in the same 
text she acknowledges that economists do not conduct their research in line with 
logical positivism, but only pay lip-service to this doctrine.  
 
These divergent opinions on whether contemporary economics is a neopositivist 
discipline or not highlight the importance of the philosophy-of-economics 
research aimed at assessing the descriptive adequacy of competing doctrines. The 
goal of this article is to address the question ‘is logical positivism a descriptively 
adequate philosophy of science?’ by studying the sound research conducted in 
2010 by Reinhart and Rogoff (henceforth RR). Growth in a Time of Debt is a 
great candidate for a case-study analysis due to its importance in shaping 
academic discourse on the relation between public debt and economic growth. 
Moreover, the analysis influenced the post-crisis public policy and its subsequent 
criticism. Additionally, the quantitative method employed by RR is 
comparatively simple, and discussing it from a philosophical perspective does 
not demand advanced knowledge of econometrics. However, it should be noted 
that the below-described analysis has restrained from discussing the Reinhart-
Rogoff controversy in detail. The problem whether or not Herndon, Ash, and 
Pollin’s (2014) criticism is justified was recently considered by Maziarz (2017), 
who argued that the Growth in a Time of Debt controversy exemplifies the 
‘emerging contrary result’ phenomenon described by Goldfarb (1997; 1995). 
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The article consists of two main sections, followed by concluding remarks. First, 
the doctrine of logical positivism is rationally reconstructed and operationalized 
in the context of economic research. Second, the method employed by RR is 
discussed and the philosophical presuppositions underlying it are reconstructed. 
Finally, Growth in a Time of Debt is shown to exemplify the logical-positivist 
methodology, and general remarks about how resigning from neopositivist 
presuppositions might help toward a better understanding of economics conclude 
the considerations.  
 
 
Logical positivism and economic research 
 
The doctrine of logical positivism was coined and elaborated by groups of 
philosophically oriented scientists, logicians, and philosophers, originally 
working in several academic centers in Europe, who immigrated to the United 
States after the start of World War II. The two most important and popular 
groups were the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle. However, Blaug (1992, p. 
17) also listed the Lwow-Warsaw School and the Uppsala School. The list of 
most notable logical positivists includes Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Kurt 
Gödel, Otto Neurath, Moritz Schlick, Carl Hempel, and Hans Reichenbach 
(McGrew, Alspector-Kelly and Allhoff 2009, p. 307-308). 
 
Logical positivist ideas are grounded on one hand in the opposition to the 
rationalist philosophical systems – exemplified by, for instance, Georg Hegel – 
and on the other hand, the empiricist presuppositions held by major physicists 
of that time and August Comte’s positivism. It should be noted that those 
philosophers never created a single, unified philosophical school, but that their 
philosophical viewpoints constantly evolved and improved. Therefore, the 
concept of logical positivism as known today is based on simplifications and 
generalizations. During the last decades of the twentieth century, several 
historians of the philosophy of science (Friedman, (1999) and Richardson 
(1988), for instance) attempted to reformulate the popular-in-the-literature 
interpretation of logical positivism. According to their so-called revisionist 
interpretation of the traditional viewpoint, neopositivism and Kuhnian views on 
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science and incommensurability are not contradictory. On the contrary, Izrik 
and Grünberg (1995) argued that the viewpoint of logical positivists encountered 
a problem later known as the Duhem-Quine thesis. In a Duhem-Quine scenario, 
theories are underdetermined by observation. And a disconfirming 
observation/experiment falsifies more than the single hypothesis or theory under 
consideration; it falsifies the whole edifice of knowledge. 
 
However, below, the logical-positivist doctrine is reconstructed in line with the 
traditional interpretation for two reasons. First, the revisionist interpretation is 
not widely supported among philosophers of science. For instance, Oliveira 
(2007) pointed out that Kuhn’s opus magnum, Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions was published in a volume edited by Rudolf Carnap (Encyclopaedia 
of Unified Science), a fact that makes it difficult to acknowledge Carnap’s 
support for Kuhn’s ideas. Secondly, the philosophers and methodologists 
interested in economics seem to support the usual understanding of logical 
positivism (cf. Boumans and Davis 2016, 13-14; McCloskey 1998, 139-155; 
Hutchison 1938, 3-17).  
 
Detailed descriptions of the logical-positivist doctrine are present in the 
literature (cf. Ladyman’s (2002, p. 151)), therefore, instead of delivering a 
detailed description thereof, the purpose of this article is simply to address the 
question whether or not Growth in a Time of Debt is a piece of neopositivist 
science. Several aspects of the doctrine will be highlighted in the reconstruction 
delivered below: (1) neopositivist views on causation, (2) limiting the knowledge 
to analytic and synthetic reasoning only, (3), the correspondence definition of 
truth, (4) the demarcation problem, (5) confirmationism, and (6) views on 
scientific laws.  
 
Causality in logical positivism 
The doctrine of logical positivism, as mentioned above, can be traced back to the 
development of British empiricism. Especially the neopositivist views 
concerning causality were inspired by one of the representatives of British 
empiricism. David Hume (1963, 34-35) believed that causality can be understood 
in a reductionist way, based on the assumption that it is impossible for humans 
to experience the relation between cause and effect. Instead, we can only observe 
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constant conjunctions of two events. (cf. Maziarz (2015) for a detailed discussion 
how the concept of Granger-causality emerged from the Humean account.) Also, 
Ernst Mach’s philosophical considerations of the question what is causality? can 
be said to inspire logical positivists (Smith 1989). Due to these inspirations, 
logical positivists held that causality can be reduced to constant or statistical 
conjunctions and interpreted as functional and correlational dependencies. The 
reductionists’ approach to causality also inspired their viewpoint on the cause-
effect relation and their interpretation of scientific laws (to be explained 
further). 
 
Analytic and synthetic reasoning 
One of the central tenets of the doctrine of logical positivism, one that 
highlights the empiricist orientation of the movement, is the rejection of 
metaphysics. Contrary to the neopositivist stance on metaphysics, ontological 
investigations can be useful in economics. For instance, Grüne-Yanoff (2016) 
argued that mechanistic evidence, in line with the mechanistic theories of 
causality, is crucial in corroborating econometric results. The domain of 
metaphysics was believed to be not only false but meaningless because 
ontological statements were impossible to either verify or confirm (even in the 
most liberal approach, which defined confirmability as describing any possible 
method of confirmation, even a method only theoretically conceivable). 
Meaningful sentences are, according to the logical-positivist doctrine, divided 
into two classes: analytic and synthetic statements. The former were defined as 
an outcome of logical reasoning and tautological reformulations. The latter were 
based on empirical observations. The movement of logical positivism rejected the 
concept of a priori statements coined by Immanuel Kant, Gottfried Leibniz, and 
Baruch Spinoza because they were believed to be falsified by the developments of 
science, namely Einstein’s general theory of relativity (Parrini 1995, p 47). In 
economics, axiomatic reasoning is instantiated by the assumption of profit 
maximization of firms in classical microeconomics; but addressing whether or 
not the aprioristic reasoning is justified exceeds the scope of this article. 
 
The correspondence definition of truth 
Epistemically, the neopositivists were committed to the verificationist theory of 
meaning, which, due to the theoretical developments, was later understood in 
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terms of confirmation and theoretical confirmability. Ontologically, the 
neopositivists accepted the correspondence definition of truth formalized by a 
member of Warsaw-Lvov Circle. Alfred Tarski’s (1944) concept was based on the 
reformulated Aristotle’s definition: ‘To say of what is that it is not, or of what is 
not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that is 
not, is true.’ If we wished to adapt ourselves to modern philosophical 
terminology, we could perhaps express this concept by means of the familiar 
formula: ‘The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with (or 
correspondence to) reality’ (pp. 342-343).  
 
The demarcation problem 
Defining truth as mirroring reality in language forced neopositivists to reject 
metaphysics on the grounds that such theories and views lacked cognitive 
content: ‘in the domain of metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and 
normative theory, logical analysis yields the negative result that the alleged 
statements in this domain are entirely meaningless’ (Carnap 1959, pp. 60-61). 
The neopositivists’ stance on metaphysics can be exemplified by their views on 
the central tenet of scientific realism: the philosophy-of-science theory that later 
became their philosophical successor.  
 
Carnap (1950) dealt with the question of whether or not theoretical entities 
described by physics exist by re-examining the question. He first divided the 
term ‘existence’ into two problems: ‘internal’ and ‘external’ existence. Existing 
internally, for Carnap (1950, p. 21) meant being described by a theory, to be real 
in the scientific sense, (…) to be an element of the system. On the contrary, 
external existence was the feature discussed by the realist/antirealist-debate 
participants and that kind of existence, Carnap (1950) argued, was meaningless: 
 ‘influenced by ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the Circle rejected both the thesis 
of the reality of the external world and the thesis of its irreality as pseudo-
statements; the same was the case for both the thesis of the reality of universals 
(abstract entities, in our present terminology) and the nominalistic thesis that 
they are not real and that their alleged names are not names of anything but 
merely “flatus vocis’” (p. 34).  A similar viewpoint was voiced by Moritz Schlick 
(1959). 
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Confirmationism 
In contrast to the metaphysical problems that were believed by the neopositivist 
to be meaningless, meaningful were those sentences that, according to Schlick 
(1936), could, in principle, at least, be verified. However, considering the fact 
that the great majority of scientific laws is impossible to conclusively verify, 
Carnap (1936) argued that the criterion of meaning should be based on the 
concept of confirmation, instead. Verification of a statement is a process of 
showing that it is true. However, even a philosophy class example of a scientific 
law, the law ‘all swans are white’ is impossible to be verified, because it is in 
principle impossible to enumeratively induce that there is no black swan. 
Alternatively, according to the ‘confirmationist criterion of meaning’, statements 
are meaningful if it is possible to conceive of a method of confirmation of a 
sentence, i.e. to describe when a considered sentence will be true (even if, in the 
philosophy-of-science literature, the term ‘verificationist criterion of meaning’ 
remained unchanged). As Carnap (1936, p. 420) put it, ‘a definitive and final 
establishment of truth, then no (synthetic) sentence is ever verifiable, as we 
shall see. We can only confirm a sentence more and more. (…) we call [a 
statement] (…) confirmable if we know under what conditions the sentence 
would be confirmed.’ 
 
Carnap (1936) also voiced his developed viewpoint on the process of 
confirmation: ‘How do we find confirmation of a law? If we have observed a 
great many positive instances and no negative instance, we say that the 
confirmation is strong. How strong it is and whether the strength can be 
expressed numerically is still a controversial question in the philosophy of 
science’ (p. 20). This logical process of confirming scientific knowledge is very 
divergent from the Popperian falsificationism, which is a widespread approach 
to the philosophy of economics (cf. Blaug 1992; Boland 2016). According to the 
doctrine coined by Popper (2005), scientists should first construct theories and 
then attempt to falsify them, resulting in non-verifiable hypotheses. On the 
contrary, according to logical positivism, empirically oriented scientists (e.g. 
econometricians) aim at delivering evidence to support a theory/hypothesis, not 
contradict it.  
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Scientific laws 
The neopositivist viewpoint on the role of laws in the edifice of science evolved. 
Formerly, scientific laws were believed to offer an economic description of 
phenomena what was inspired by the empiricist doctrine exemplified by the 
widely-known physicist, Ernst Mach (1893). However, the twentieth-century 
logical empiricists redefined the purpose of science and the role of scientific 
laws. Instead of delivering economic descriptions, scientists should aim at 
offering explanations, which, according to the deductive-nomological model of 
explanation, are symmetrical to predictions. In other words, logical positivists 
believed that the process of explanation and prediction is the same: to predict is 
to explain ex ante, but, oppositely, to explain is to deliver data and laws 
sufficient for making right predictions (cf. Carnap 1936, pp. 3-8; Hempel 1965, 
pp. 335-338. Scientific laws are crucial for explanation and prediction according 
to D-N model of explanation.  
 
The centrality of scientific laws for the doctrine of logical positivism led to the 
development of  philosophical considerations focusing on them. Carnap (1936, 
pp. 3-4) distinguished between universal and statistical laws. Universal laws 
should be understood as ‘a (…) regularity (…) observed at all times and all places, 
without exception’. On the contrary, ‘instead of asserting that a regularity occurs 
in all cases, some laws assert that it occurs in only a certain percentage of cases. 
If the percentage is specified (…) then the statement is called a “statistical law””. 
The second distinction is made between empirical and theoretical laws. 
According to Carnap (1936, p. 5), theoretical laws entail unobservable entities 
and are characterized by a high degree of abstraction. Many theoretical laws can 
be found in particle physics or the electromagnetic field theory. On the contrary, 
empirical laws are observable generalizations between observable phenomena 
(i.e. not between theoretical entities). The neopositivist philosopher of science 
exemplified this class of scientific laws with the law of thermal expansion 
because it is based on many direct observations of physical bodies (e.g. pieces of a 
metal) and temperature. This example supports the point of view in which 
empirical laws are not necessarily grounded in unaided observations.  
 
Below, it is argued that that the sound and now infamous article describing 
cliometric research conducted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is an example of 
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research handled in line with the neopositivist doctrine. In detail, the 90%-debt 
hypothesis coined in Growth in a Time of Debt instantiates an empirical law. 
Certainly, there are theoretical approaches connecting debt and growth and even 
aimed at justifying a threshold hypothesis (Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff 
2012), but the theoretical account is not developed enough to enable formulating 
the debt-threshold level. Additionally, it is argued that the method used in this 
research shares each of the epistemic elements of the logical-positivist doctrine, 
which are reconstructed above. 
 
 
Growth in a Time of Debt as a piece of neopositivist science 
  
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) are the first cliometricians, or the first 
econometricians focused on researching economic history with the help of 
statistical and quantitative methods, who formulated a threshold hypothesis in 
the relation between public debt and economic growth. Their article Growth in a 
Time of Debt is sound for two reasons. First, the research was widely cited and 
very influential (both in terms of shaping public policy and the academic world)  
because its time of publication happened to correlate with enormous debt 
overhangs caused by the anticyclical policy implemented by most developed 
countries in response to the start of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. The 
importance of the research for shaping anti-crisis policy was highlighted by 
Krugman (2013), who described the considered piece of econometric modeling as 
surely the most influential economic analysis of recent years. Second, the 
research was highly criticized by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014), who 
discovered the spreadsheet error and accused Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) of 
other two drawbacks. Since this article’s aim is to address the question if Growth 
in a Time of Debt exemplifies neopositivist science, and not to discuss the 
Reinhart-Rogoff controversy (for the methodological analysis focused on this 
purpose, cf. Maziarz (2017)), the question whether the criticism is justified is 
not addressed below. On the contrary, further considerations focus on assessing 
whether the research described in Growth in a Time of Debt was conducted in 
line with the neopositivist doctrine. 
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Causal interpretation 
Even though Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) restrained themselves from 
interpreting the described analysis in causal terms, their finding that public 
debts (above 90% debt-to-GDP ratio) are related to slower economic growth was 
later read as causal and ready-to-implement policy advice. It was possibly 
grounded in Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010, p. 574) considerations of the causes 
why public debt overhangs arise. The empirical generalization claiming that 
high levels of public debt harms economic development was interpreted causally 
in a similar way to Cartwright’s (1989) approach to interpreting economic laws. 
It should be noted that Reinhart and Rogoff (2013a; 2013b) disagreed with the 
causal interpretation and argued that their research should be considered as a 
strictly correlational analysis. However, their research can suggest such an 
interpretation. In detail, Reiss (2013, p. 4) argued that other statements they 
made lent themselves to causal interpretation: ‘In a series of academic papers 
with Carmen Reinhart we find that very high debt levels of 90% of GDP are a 
long-term secular drag on economic growth that often lasts for two more decades 
or more (…) and they certainly regarded the 90 percent threshold an important 
indicator for policy (e.g. “Our analysis, based on these cases and the 23 others we 
identify, suggests that the long-term risks of high debt are real”).’ 
 
Analytic and synthetic reasoning 
The division of knowledge between analytic and synthetic reasoning is still 
widely acclaimed, even if the doctrine of logical positivism lost its influence on 
shaping current philosophy-of-science discussion (Woleński 2004). Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010), employing the econometric, data-based approach to 
investigating the history of economics, focused on synthetic reasoning. Their 
research, which is certainly included in mainstream economics, is also, to some 
degree, exceptional, because mainstream, neoclassical economics are often 
accused of relying too much on apriorism (cf. the classical text of Sargent and 
Sims (1977)). 
 
The correspondence definition of truth 
Unlike Maziarz (2017), who claimed that the results are constructed and depend 
on choices concerning research methods (in other words, that the relation 
between public debt and economic growth depends on employed methods), 
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), as well as their critics, i.e. Herndon, Ash, and 
Pollin (2014), are likely to support the correspondence definition of truth. 
Assuming that two contrary sentences p and ~p refer to the same reality R, only 
one of the two sentences can be true. It follows from the law of non-
contradiction, one of the three classic laws of thought, according to which two 
mutually exclusive statements cannot be right at the same time at the same place 
(Lear 1986, p. 101). In contrast, assuming a constructivist approach where true 
descriptions depend on methods, this contradiction does not occur. The 
philosophical presupposition of the correspondence definition of truth – or, (to 
use a later-developed term) of the ‘scientific realism’ held by these two teams of 
cliometricians – is implied by their claim that only one of the two results can be 
right (Reinhart and Rogoff 2013a; 2013b; Herndon, Ash, and Pollin 2014). 
 
The demarcation problem 
As mentioned above, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) did not consider whether their 
correlational research could be interpreted in causal terms (even though it was) 
and, in spite of admitting that the 90%-threshold hypothesis is applicable and 
should shape economic policy, they did not take sides in the debate about 
causality. The authors can be suspected of an unvoiced support for the 
manipulationist account of causality, but their failure to consider this issue is in 
line with the neopositivist approach to the demarcation problem and 
meaningful-meaningless division. In a similar vein, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) 
did not consider questions about whether their definitions of public debt and 
economic growth rightly refer to reality, even though ‘public debt’ can be defined 
and calculated in different ways (cf. Maziarz 2016). Instead, they treated the 
variables entailed in their database instrumentalistically. It should be noted as a 
reminder that according to the logical-positivist doctrine, both theories of 
causality and problems of ‘external’ existence are considered to be meaningless 
(Carnap 1950; Schlick 1959). 
 
The confirmationist approach to the coined hypothesis 
One of the easiest-to-see differences between logical positivism and other 
antirealist philosophy-of-science theories is highlighting confirmationism as a 
method of justifying statements. For instance, in contrast to Popperian 
fallibilism, the method advised by the logical positivists of justifying hypotheses 
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is distinct. As Carnap (1936, p 420) put it, ‘a sentence is ever verifiable, as we 
shall see. We can only confirm a sentence more and more’. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) attempted at fulfilling the neopositivist ideal of the knowledge-
justification process by setting up statistics for four slightly different databases. 
Since the results for each of the three sets of country/year observations were 
similar, the 90%-threshold hypothesis was acknowledged by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) to be justified. Considering the methods employed by the authors of 
Growth in a Time of Debt, it is clearly visible that they aimed at confirming 
their hypothesis instead of, for example, falsifying it according to the epistemic 
advice of fallibilism. They produced empirical generalization from data 
confirmed by the 90%-debt hypothesis instead of drawing such an implication 
from the macroeconomic theory and attempting to falsify it. The confirmationist 
approach shown by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is likely the most easy-to-see 
feature of their research conducted in line with the neopositivist doctrine. 
 
The 90%-threshold hypotheses as an empirical law  
However, their approach to establishing the 90%-threshold hypothesis 
instantiates Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) commitment to the methodology 
offered by logical positivism. In order to coin the hypothesis, the American 
cliometricians observed the empirical dependence, or, to use logical-positivist 
terminology, empirical regularity between public debt and economic growth. In 
detail, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) divided all the country-year observations 
into four baskets: low debt (below 30%), medium debt (30-60%), high debt (60-
90%), and very high debt (over 90%).Subsequently, they calculated weighted 
average pace of economic growth for each of the four baskets. The choice of 
averaging scheme was criticized by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin (2014) as one of 
three drawbacks, because it equated the influence of a single country-year 
observation with a case like Greece, which was included in the basket of very 
high debt for 19 years between 1946 and 2009. However, contrary voices 
indicating that the two methods are justified to a similar degree are present in 
the literature (cf. Maziarz 2017; Hamilton 2013).  
 
Whatever the result of this dispute will be, Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2010) method 
was generally based on observing the relation between public debt and economic 
growth and coining the empirical law, stating that the pace of economic growth 
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of countries with public debt over roughly 90 percent of GDP are about one 
percent lower than otherwise (p. 573). A counterargument might object that such 
a method is not observation, since ‘public debt’ and ‘economic growth’ are not 
observables, but rather theoretical constructs or theoretical entities, to use the 
neopositivist terminology. However, similarly to the above-discussed case of 
observing the temperature of a metal in physics (which entails the use of a 
thermometer constructed according to physical theories), these economic 






Growth in a Time of Debt can justifiably be said to instantiate neopositivist 
science. First, even though the causal interpretation of Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
result is sometimes believed to be an exaggeration, by highlighting the 
importance of the 90%-threshold hypothesis for economic-policy making, the 
authors are likely to hold the reductionist presupposition on causality, according 
to which causal phenomena are instantiated by constant regularities. Second, 
their data-based approach to research fulfils the analytic/synthetic division of 
knowledge and instantiates the former. Third, their strong disagreement 
supports the view that only one of the two results can be interpreted as Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s (2010) commitment to the correspondence definition of truth. 
Fourth, the hypothesis which the American philosophers commit to the 
neopositivist methodology is further corroborated (or confirmed, to borrow the 
logical positivist term) by the fact that their research and considerations do not 
deal with metaphysical questions. The article does not voice an opinion about 
how causality is understood. In fact, the authors consider their finding in terms 
of empirical regularity, even though they state that it has direct implications for 
economic-policy making. Fifth, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) employ the 
confirmationist approach to evidence: they attempt to deliver further 
corroborations. Finally, the 90%-threshold hypothesis instantiates empirical law. 
 
Maziarz, Mariusz (2017), '“Growth in a Time of Debt“ as an example of the  
logical-positivist science', The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on 
Economic and Social Issues, X: 2, 47-64 
 
60                     The Journal of Philosophical Economics X: 2 (2017) 
The Reinhart-Rogoff controversy got a lot of attention both among academic 
economists and the general public. Its soundness is probably exaggerated, 
considering Maziarz’s (2017) argument, that the influence of the spreadsheet 
error was minor in comparison to the influence of choosing weighted or 
unweighted averaging scheme for the results. In contrast, the controversy is not 
an affair (as the synonymic ‘Reinhart-Rogoff affair’ states), but rather a normal 
occurrence in the empirical literature methodological discussion. Nevertheless, 
considering that the above-mentioned voices criticize economics as a (still) 
neopositivist science, analysing whether most sound examples of the current 
economic research are conducted in line with the logical positivist methodology 
seems to be justified and fruitful. 
 
As Maziarz (2017) indicated, the Reinhart-Rogoff controversy instantiates the 
‘emerging contrary result’ phenomenon (a.k.a. ‘emerging recalcitrant result’, or 
ERR phenomenon), which was created by submission/publication and originally 
described by Robert Goldfarb (1995; 1997). According to the American economic 
methodologist, econometricians change their opinion on macroeconomic issues 
because there is an institutional pressure that forces them to look for novel 
results. It might be hypothesized that a similar phenomenon can be observed 
also in philosophical investigations, and this hypothesis should be further 
researched. For instance, the history of interpreting the logical-positivist 
doctrine seems to reflect the pattern in the literature that is a characteristic 
feature of the ERR phenomenon caused by the submission/publication bias. 
First, one viewpoint is established in the literature (the traditional 
interpretation). Second, there are researchers that question this previously 
established result (Friedman (1999) and Richardson (1988) are good examples). 
Third, a new viewpoint (the revisionist interpretation, in this case) is 
established. Therefore, the question if ERR phenomenon exists also in the 
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argument was substantially improved due to the comments voiced by Dr Bartosz 
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